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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

28 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
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SUBJECT: NIE 12-57: STABILITY AND COHESION OF THE SOVIET
SATELLITE STRUCTURE

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on 28 September.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on 7 December. The target for IAC consideration of this paper will be in January 1957.

William P. Bundy
WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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SUBJECT: NIE 12-57: TERMS OF REFERENCE: STABILITY AND COHESION OF THE
SOVIET SATELLITE STRUCTURE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for stability and cohesion in the
Soviet Satellite structure.

SCOPE

In order to highlight the effects of the Soviet XX Party Congress
and related developments in the USSR on its European Satellites, it
is intended to limit the scope of the 1957 Satellite estimate to an
examination of the outlook for stability in the Satellite system
as a whole and in its individual members, an examination in which

SECRET

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the evolution of Satellite relationships with the USSR is the key factor. This estimate will therefore not review comprehensively the economic, scientific, and military prospects of the Satellites, and will supersede only those portions of NIE 12-56 bearing directly on its subject problem. For the purposes of the estimate the Democratic Republic of Germany is considered a member of the Satellite system; Yugoslavia is not. The following questions are suggested as elements of the examination.

A. Soviet Controls

1. What are the principal Soviet devices for control of the Satellite regimes? Have they been modified during the past year? If so, to what extent and in what manner? Has the USSR intentionally modified them, and if so from what motives? What use does the USSR now make of such instruments of control as Soviet garrisons, Warsaw pact arrangements, Soviet diplomatic, police, or Party representatives, Soviet economic advice and aid, Satellite reparations deliveries, CEMA, joint enterprises? What are the salient variations in Soviet control practice from Satellite to Satellite, and what are the reasons for these variations?
2. Are there likely to be changes in the nature and extent of Soviet controls during the next few years? How would such changes affect the cohesion of the system? Is any Satellite/ party likely to be permitted

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

a measure of autonomy comparable to that of the Yugoslav or Chinese party? If so, what effect would it have on the solidarity of the system's front against the West, including the coordination of its economic drive in underdeveloped countries and of its foreign economic policy generally?

3. If the Communist Party in any Satellite were in danger of losing power or seemed ready to adopt anti-Soviet courses or policies not acceptable to Moscow, what courses of action would be open to the USSR? What would be the consequences of various alternatives? Would the USSR, if necessary to prevent unacceptable developments, undertake open intervention by force?

B. INTER-SATELLITE RELATIONS

4. To what extent are bilateral relations among the Satellites, with Communist China, with Yugoslavia, independent from Soviet direction? Are such relations likely to develop groupings with interests at variance with Soviet interests? Is Yugoslav influence in the Satellites likely to become a significant factor in determining their policies? What is the nature

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

and extent of any frictions between Satellites, as between Poland and the GDR? What new or aggravated frictions are likely to arise, for example as a result of East German foreign economic enterprise or of clashing interpretations of "different roads to socialism"?

5. What significant variations in internal or external policy are likely from Satellite to Satellite?

C. SATELLITE INTERNAL STABILITY

6. What are the principal factors leading to factionalism in the Satellite parties? What effect would any modification of Soviet controls have on factionalism? To what extent is factionalism likely to affect the stability of the regimes? allegiance to Moscow? ability of the regimes to command popular support?
7. What are the broad prospects for economic improvement in the Satellites? How are such improvements likely to affect standards of living and the dissatisfaction of the people with their regimes?

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

8. What changes have been made by the several Satellite regimes in the nature or in the exercise of internal controls? To what extent are repressive and coercive measures likely to be instigated or abandoned? What would be the likely effect of such relaxations on economic prospects? party solidarity? popular attitude toward the regimes? ability of the regimes to maintain order?

- 5 -

SECRET